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UNDERSTANDING TERMINATIONS FOR “DISABILITYCAUSED MISCONDUCT” AS FAILURES TO PROVIDE
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION
Michael S. Verdichizzi*
INTRODUCTION
Among those impairments that may be considered “disabilities”
under the law of employment discrimination, mental conditions are
unique in that they are usually invisible.1 An employee with a mental
condition may spend years at the same job without her coworkers
becoming aware that she has a disability—unlike, perhaps, cases
involving a hearing-impaired person, or someone who requires the use
of a wheelchair.2 Ailments such as bipolar disorder, post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD), or obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) often
manifest themselves only in behaviors likely considered by peers to be
odd or eccentric.3 Often these behaviors are considered violations of
workplace conduct rules,4 which are in some cases designed to screen
out individuals with mental conditions.5 Further, the invisible nature
of mental conditions can make them difficult for other individuals to
* J.D. Candidate, University of Notre Dame Law School, 2023; B.A., Providence
College, 2020. I thank Administrative Judge John Burkhardt of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission for his guidance and patience in overseeing my work on the cases
that inspired this Note. I also thank my parents and my brothers for their unending support
of my education, and the staff of Volume 97 of the Notre Dame Law Review for their hard
work and dedication.
1 Lizabeth A. Barclay & Karen S. Markel, Ethical Fairness and Human Rights: The
Treatment of Employees with Psychiatric Disabilities, 85 J. BUS. ETHICS 333, 335 (2009) (“An
individual with a psychiatric disability at first glance looks the same as other individuals. . . .
Once the illness is discovered by others, the person with the condition is subject to negative
attributions.”); see also Andrew Hsieh, The Catch-22 of ADA Title I Remedies for Psychiatric
Disabilities, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 989, 1003 (2013).
2 See SUSAN STEFAN, HOLLOW PROMISES: EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 10 (2002) (“Others struggle with depression and
perform so capably that their coworkers and customers never suspect that they are
experiencing tremendous difficulties.”).
3 See Hsieh, supra note 1, at 1002–04.
4 Id. at 1003.
5 See STEFAN, supra note 2, at 155.
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understand or empathize with. This lack of understanding among the
public, coupled with the growing belief that mental conditions can
lead to mass shootings or other acts of violence, contributes to the
formation of harmful stereotypes about people who experience mental
conditions.6
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) is the primary legal
mechanism for protecting private-sector employees who experience a
disability, whether mental or physical.7 Given that mental conditions
often manifest themselves only in unusual, or perhaps disruptive,
behaviors, what obligations, if any, does the ADA impose on employers
when an employee’s misconduct is caused by a known mental
disability? As the Eleventh Circuit recently acknowledged, circuits are
split on this issue.8 A majority of courts have concluded that the
violation of a workplace conduct standard, so long as the standard is
applied even-handedly and out of business necessity, always constitutes
a lawful basis for termination.9 By contrast, the Second,10 Ninth,11 and
Tenth12 Circuit Courts of Appeals, as well as at least one district court
outside those circuits,13 treat disability-caused-misconduct as “part and
parcel”14 of the underlying disability, with the result that an employer

6 Ann Hubbard, The ADA, the Workplace, and the Myth of the “Dangerous Mentally Ill,”
34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 849, 851–52 (2001); id. at 851 n.4 (explaining that people with mental
disabilities are frequently viewed not only as dangerous, but as “lazy, malingering, weak or
just plain ‘bad’”).
7 Hsieh, supra note 1, at 995.
8 Caporicci v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 729 Fed. App’x 812, 816, 816 n.5 (11th
Cir. 2018) (acknowledging that “other circuits are split” on whether a firing based on
disability-related misconduct constitutes disability-based discrimination under the ADA); see
also Lauren Fierro, Reasonably Accommodating Employees with Mental Health Conditions by
Putting Them Back to Work, 46 SW. L. REV. 423, 432–33 (2017).
9 See, e.g., Hamilton v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047 (5th Cir. 1998); Palmer v. Cir.
Ct. of Cook Cnty., 117 F.3d 351 (7th Cir. 1997); Foley v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC,
No. 0:11-cv-62476, 2013 WL 795108 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 4, 2013); see also EEOC v. Amego, Inc.,
110 F.3d 135 (1st Cir. 1997); see also Virginia Mixon Swindell, Symposium: Employment Law:
But My Disability Made Me Do It: ADA Claims Involving Disability-Related Misconduct, 69
ADVOCATE 8, 9 (2014) (noting that a majority of courts have concluded that the decision to
terminate an employee for misconduct is a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, “even
when the misconduct is arguably caused by the employee’s disability”).
10 E.g., Teahan v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 951 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1991); see
also Mercado v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., No. 95 CIV. 10018, 1998 WL 151039 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31,
1998).
11 E.g., Humphrey v. Mem’l Hosps. Ass’n, 239 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2001); Dark v. Curry
Cnty., 451 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2006); EEOC v. Walgreen Co., 34 F. Supp. 3d 1049 (N.D. Cal.
2014).
12 E.g., Den Hartog v. Wasatch Acad., 129 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 1997).
13 See Walsted v. Woodbury Cnty., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1318 (N.D. Iowa 2000).
14 Michelle A. Travis, The Part and Parcel of Impairment Discrimination, 17 EMP. RTS. &
EMP. POL’Y J. 35, 45 (2013) (quoting Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment

2022]

TERMINATIONS FOR “DISABILITY-CAUSED MISCONDUCT”

1737

is liable for employment discrimination if she fires an employee on the
basis of misconduct which the employer knows was an actual result of
the employee’s disability.
The Note proceeds as follows. Part I provides a primer on the
sorts of disability discrimination the ADA prohibits, with a special focus
on the three types of claims one may bring under the act: disparate
treatment, disparate impact, and failure to accommodate. Part II
explores the current state of the misconduct issue in the disability
discrimination context and demonstrates the circuit split by way of case
analyses. Part III presents the principal argument of this Note, that
uncontroversial canons of statutory interpretation demonstrate the
erroneousness of the majority view, that the majority view hinders the
ADA’s objective of equal opportunity for individuals with disabilities,
and that the minority view should be adopted under a failure to
accommodate theory of discrimination liability.
I.

DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ADA

The general rule of the ADA is that no employer15 “shall
discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability” in
regard to hiring, discharge, or other terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment.16 Rather than list impairments that per se constitute
disabilities for antidiscrimination purposes, the ADA defines
“disability” as a physical or mental impairment that “substantially
limits” one or more major life activities.17 In creating this test of
substantial limitation, rather than listing medical diagnoses that
“count” as a disability, the drafters of the ADA intended to leave it to
courts to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether a particular

Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, as Amended, 76 Fed. Reg. 16985 (Mar. 25,
2011) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630)).
15 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2018). “Employer” means a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce with at least fifteen employees.
Id. § 12111(5)(A).
The
antidiscrimination provision also applies to employment agencies, labor organizations, and
joint labor-management committees. Id. § 12111(2). Where the employer is the federal
government, the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–96, applies instead of the ADA. See
42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(B) (2018).
16 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2018).
17 Id. § 12102 (1)(A). Having a “record” of such an impairment, or being regarded
as having such an impairment, may also qualify as a disability under the ADA. Id.
§ 12102(1)(B), (C). Major life activities include “caring for oneself, performing manual
tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking,
breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working,” as
well as “the operation of a major bodily function, including but not limited to, functions of
the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain,
respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions.” Id. § 12102(2)(A), (B).
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plaintiff is a person with a disability.18 This structure transforms the
inquiry of whether someone has a disability from a factual question to
a legal one.19
As a threshold matter, a plaintiff claiming disability discrimination
under the ADA must show that she is a “qualified individual,” meaning
she “can perform the essential functions” of the position she holds or
desires, “with or without reasonable accommodation.”20 This showing
is required not because it tends to show that the employer has
discriminated against the employee, but because the ADA prohibits
discrimination only where the victim is a “qualified individual[].”21
For instance, imagine that a manager fires an employee with a
disability because he holds a personal animosity toward the disabled.
Here, in a factual sense, discrimination has occurred. However, if the
employee failed to show that she was “qualified” under the meaning
of § 12111(8), the employer would incur no liability, because the
person he discriminated against was not a member of the relevant
protected class.22 This nuance makes the ADA unique among
antidiscrimination statutes. For example, in a Title VII claim, plaintiffs
belong to a protected class by virtue of the same personal quality—
race, sex, or sexual identity—upon which the Act prohibits

18 STEFAN, supra note 2, at 5.
19 This deference to courts to determine whether someone has a disability became
controversial shortly after the enactment of the ADA, as the courts adopted what many
considered an all-too-narrow construction of what it meant to have a disability. See Hsieh,
supra note 1, at 993–94. The Supreme Court insisted that the ADA definition of disabilities
“need[s] to be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as
disabled.” Toyota Motor Mfg., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002). This narrow
conception had the effect of denying recovery to many ADA plaintiffs, especially those
claiming to have a mental impairment. STEFAN, supra note 2, at 71, 75. In response,
Congress enacted the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”), which enumerated an
expansive, non-exhaustive range of “major life activities” and stated that “[t]he definition
of disability in this chapter shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals
under this chapter, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter.” 42
U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A) (2018); Hsieh, supra note 1, at 994.
20 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2018) (defining “qualified individual”). The EEOC
regulations define “essential functions” as “the fundamental job duties of the employment
position the individual with a disability holds or desires” and specify that the term “does
not include the marginal functions of the position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1) (2020).
Generalization beyond this point is difficult; essential functions are best understood as the
functions which the job exists to perform. See, e.g., U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
EEOC-NVTA-2008-3, APPLYING PERFORMANCE AND CONDUCT STANDARDS TO EMPLOYEES
WITH DISABILITIES pt. II (2008) (defining “essential functions” as “the most important job
duties”).
21 Kelly Cahill Timmons, Accommodating Misconduct Under the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 57 FLA. L. REV. 187, 190–91 (2005).
22 See id. at 190–91.
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discrimination.23 By contrast, ADA plaintiffs are protected from
disability discrimination only insofar as they are “qualified,” even
though the ADA prohibits discrimination based on disability status; in
other words, the ADA declines to protect everyone who can claim
membership in the very class that constitutes an unlawful basis for
discrimination.
What does it mean, then, to “discriminate” against a qualified
individual on the basis of disability? The section following the ADA’s
“general rule” is titled “construction” and lists, non-exhaustively, seven
acts or omissions “include[d]” in the term “discriminate against a
qualified individual on the basis of disability.”24 Together the seven
acts and omissions have come to form three distinct theories of
discrimination which the ADA prohibits: disparate treatment,
disparate impact, and failure to accommodate.25
The theory of discrimination as “disparate treatment” captures
what lay people probably mean when they use the term
“discrimination”: unfairly treating an individual or group of
individuals differently than others.26 Simply put, disparate treatment
is intentional discrimination.27 Disparate treatment occurs when an
employee’s disability motivates the adverse employment action taken
against her. Thus, the plaintiff must show that the forbidden
consideration, disability, was a “but-for” cause of the adverse action.28
Because motive can be difficult to prove in discrimination cases, the
Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green established a
burden-shifting framework by which a Title VII or ADA plaintiff may
prove disparate treatment by way of circumstantial evidence.29 The
McDonnell Douglas framework partitions the disparate treatment
analysis into three parts. First, the plaintiff must establish a “prima
facie” case of disparate treatment, by showing that (a) she has a
disability; (b) she was qualified for the job in question; and (c) an

23 See id. at 191 n.14; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (2018).
24 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (2018).
25 See, e.g., Cinnamon Hills Youth Crisis Ctr., Inc. v. Saint George City, 685 F.3d 917,
919 (10th Cir. 2012) (noting that the three “theories” of a disability discrimination claim
are intentional discrimination, conduct having an unlawful disparate impact, and failure to
provide a reasonable accommodation).
26 Discrimination, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2021); Int’l Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (“‘Disparate treatment’ . . . is the
most easily understood type of discrimination. The employer simply treats some people
less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”).
27 Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009).
28 E.g., Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 962 (7th Cir. 2010).
29 411 U.S. 792, 801–05 (1973). McDonnell Douglas was decided before the enactment
of the ADA, but it has since been applied to ADA cases in every jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 49 (2003).
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adverse employment decision was made under circumstances which
give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.30 If the prima facie
case is established, a presumption of discrimination arises, and the
burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged employment action.31
Finally, if the employer articulates a legitimate reason, the burden
shifts back to the plaintiff, who must then show that the articulated
reason was pretextual, i.e., an ad hoc cover-up for the true,
discriminatory motive.32
Next, whereas disparate treatment addresses intentional
discrimination, the disparate impact theory addresses the existence of
policies, standards, or other workplace conditions that have a
discriminatory effect, regardless of whether their formulation involved
discriminatory motive.33 In the context of the enactment of the
Rehabilitation Act, the Supreme Court has noted that
“[d]iscrimination against the handicapped was perceived by Congress
to be most often the product, not of invidious animus, but rather of
thoughtlessness and indifference—of benign neglect.”34 Thus, 42
U.S.C. § 12112(b) specifies that disability discrimination includes
“using qualification standards, employment tests or other selection
criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a
disability” and “utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of
administration . . . that have the effect of discrimination on the basis
of disability.”35 In effect, this means that an employer can incur ADA
liability even when they do not intend to discriminate. In order to
prevail on a disparate impact claim, a plaintiff need only show that a
facially neutral employment practice or policy had an adverse effect on
her because of her disability, at which point it becomes the employer’s
burden to show that the practice in question is job-related and
consistent with business necessity.36 For example, imagine that a parcel

30 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Butler v. City of Prairie Vill., 172 F.3d 736, 748
(10th Cir. 1999)
31 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. However, the employer’s burden is only one of
production, and the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that intentional
discrimination occurred remains at all times with the plaintiff. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v.
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993) (citing Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
253 (1981)).
32 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
33 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) (concluding that Title VII
prohibits practices, procedures, and tests with discriminatory effect even if they are “neutral
in terms of intent”); Raytheon, 540 U.S. at 53 (“Both disparate-treatment and disparateimpact claims are cognizable under the ADA.”).
34 Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295 (1985).
35 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3), (6) (2018).
36 Timmons, supra note 21, at 202.
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service categorically rejects all applicants for a driving position if the
applicant’s hearing abilities fail to meet the service’s prescribed
standards.37 Although the parcel service, in formulating this policy,
very probably had innocent intentions, the qualification standard is
discriminatory on its face against people with hearing disabilities.38 If
the parcel service could not show that the hearing standards were jobrelated and consistent with business necessity, it would be liable for
discrimination under a disparate impact theory.39
The final theory of discrimination, failure to accommodate, is
unique in that it imposes liability for omissions rather than acts.
Disparate treatment requires an adverse employment decision, and
disparate impact requires there to be a policy, standard, or condition
applies throughout the workplace. By contrast, the ADA provisions
involving reasonable accommodation impose an affirmative obligation
on employers to act in a certain way.40 Discrimination by failure to
accommodate is in many cases an issue not of malfeasance, but
nonfeasance. Section 12112 provides that disability discrimination
includes “not making reasonable accommodations to the known
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with
a disability who is an applicant or employee,” absent a showing that
providing the accommodations would involve undue hardship.41
Another unique feature of this provision is the scienter requirement:
only a “known” limitation must be accommodated.42 Often, the
employer’s knowledge is by itself insufficient to trigger the duty to
accommodate; the employee must first request an accommodation
(although the employee need not use the magic word
“accommodation”) unless the need is extremely obvious.43 For
example, imagine that the management staff of a hospital becomes
aware that an employee suffers from severe asthma and that said
employee currently works in an area of the hospital undergoing
construction.44 Under the reasonable accommodation provisions of
the ADA, hospital management has an affirmative duty to relocate the
employee to an area of the hospital free of construction dust and
materials, provided that the cost of doing so is not unreasonable.45
37 See Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 981 (9th Cir. 2007).
38 See id. at 988.
39 See id. at 992–93.
40 Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cnty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1987).
41 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2018).
42 Id.
43 Timmons, supra note 21, at 199 (“In order to trigger the duty to accommodate, a
plaintiff generally must inform the employer of his or her disability and request an
accommodation.”).
44 See Naughton v. Gilbane, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 3d 152, 153 (D.R.I. 2014).
45 Id. at 154.
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For better or worse, almost every ADA case has been analyzed
according to one of these three theories of discrimination.46 It is
difficult to imagine a type of discrimination which does not fit under
one of the theories. But it is no secret that many litigants and courts
have confused or conflated the categories.47 Such confusion generally
results in a judgment in favor of the employer because plaintiffs
laboring under such confusion might mistakenly tailor the evidence
they produce to one theory or another and because courts will
consider the disparate impact theory waived if it is not set forth in the
complaint—despite the fact that disparate treatment and disparate
impact are treated as mere “constructions” of the general
antidiscrimination provision which is invoked in any ADA case.48
II.

WORKPLACE MISCONDUCT IN THE ADA CONTEXT

In this area of the law, “misconduct” simply refers to conduct by
an employee that provokes discipline or disapproval by the employer,
usually because the conduct violates a promulgated standard of
workplace behavior or because coworkers find the employee’s conduct
inappropriate or discomforting.49 “Misconduct” thus encompasses a
wide variety of behaviors falling into several categories, including
attendance issues,50 such as absenteeism, tardiness, and leave abuse;
conflicts with co-workers,51 supervisors, or patrons, such as making
inflammatory comments or threats, insubordination, harassment, or
engaging in verbal or physical altercations; inventory theft;52 being or
becoming under the influence of drugs or alcohol while working;53 and
dress code or safety equipment violations.54 Employers sued for
terminations predicated on misconduct often concede that the

46 See Timmons, supra note 21, at 189.
47 See Joseph A. Seiner, Disentangling Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment: Adapting
the Canadian Approach, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 95, 107, 135 (2006).
48 See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 53 (2003); see also Seiner, supra note
47, at 113 (observing that Hazen Paper and Raytheon “provide excellent examples of how an
individual who may have been discriminated against by an employer’s facially neutral policy
can fall through the cracks and walk away with nothing”).
49 See STEFAN, supra note 2, at 153 (describing how misconduct cases “run the gamut”
of a wide range of behaviors); id. at 157 (“Sometimes the employee breaks no ‘rule’ but
behaves in a way that makes other employees or customers uncomfortable.”).
50 E.g., Humphrey v. Mem’l Hosp. Ass’n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1130 (9th Cir. 2001).
51 E.g., Palmer v. Cir. Ct. of Cook Cnty., 117 F.3d 351, 351–52 (7th Cir. 1997).
52 E.g., EEOC v. Walgreen Co., 34 F. Supp. 3d 1049, 1050–51 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
53 See, e.g., Teahan v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 951 F.2d 511, 513 (2d Cir.
1991).
54 E.g., Holmes v. Gen. Dynamics Mission Sys., Inc., 835 Fed. App’x 688, 689 (4th Cir.
2020).

2022]

TERMINATIONS FOR “DISABILITY-CAUSED MISCONDUCT”

1743

employee-plaintiff met or exceeded job performance expectations.55
Many of these plaintiffs received designations like “trainer of the
month”56 or “the company’s all-time profit producer,”57 or their
performance evaluations indicate that, apart from their ailment, they
would have been a model employee.58
The law has to some extent embraced this distinction between
conduct and performance.59 Thus, the fact that an employee has
engaged in misconduct, even repeatedly, does not preclude her being
considered a qualified individual, since whether an employee engages
in intermittent conduct violations has little to do with her ability to
perform her regular duties.60 For example, that a talented software
engineer is prone to occasional fits of anger in which he punches holes
in the wall does not necessarily preclude his being “qualified,” though
it may provide a legitimate basis for his termination. Generally,
misconduct comes to bear on an employee’s qualifications only when
the employee may pose a significant risk of substantial harm to other
individuals in the workplace, because the ADA provides a “direct
threat” defense whereby an employee posing such a threat may be
considered disqualified regardless of her ability to perform the
essential functions of her position.61
When a plaintiff brings an ADA claim that involves misconduct by
the employee, the following fact pattern usually forms the basis for the
55 See STEFAN, supra note 2, at 103.
56 E.g., Venable v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 211, 216 (D. Me. 2009).
57 E.g., Holihan v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d 362, 364 (9th Cir. 1996).
58 E.g., Humphrey v. Mem’l Hosp. Ass’n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2001).
59 Sista v. CDC Ixis N. Am., Inc., 445 F.3d 161, 171–72 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Owens
v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 934 F.2d 405, 409 (2d Cir. 1991)) (“[M]isconduct is distinct, however,
from the issue of minimal qualification to perform a job. An individual may well have the
ability to perform job duties, even if her conduct on the job is inappropriate or offensive.
Accordingly, the finding of misconduct here cannot preclude [the plaintiff] from showing
her qualification for employment . . . .”); see also Venable, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 214, 219
(genuine issue of fact as to whether epileptic employee could perform essential functions
of her trainer position even where employee admitted to being abrasive and receiving
“unacceptable” rating in teamwork).
60 In administrative hearings for claims of disability discrimination against federal
agencies, the EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations has declined to consider regular
attendance an essential function of any position, reasoning that it creates a “circular
argument.” Ruiz v. Frank, EEOC DOC 05880859, 1990 WL 711461, at *4 (May 21, 1990)
(“If attendance is considered an essential job function, any frequently absent handicapped
employee could be considered unqualified and, thus, an agency always could avoid the issue
of reasonable accommodation.”).
61 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2018). The use of direct threat qualification standards
requires an individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform
the essential functions of the job based on a reasonable medical judgment and can exclude
only individuals who pose a “significant risk.” See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 649
(1998).
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complaint. First, during or before employment with the defendant,
the plaintiff was diagnosed with a medical condition; then, the plaintiff
violated a workplace conduct rule; in response, the employer
discharged the plaintiff for violating the rule; finally, the plaintiff can
draw some connection between her medical condition or its treatment
and her violation of the rule.62 Courts generally agree that if the
employer did not know of and did not have reason to know of the
disability until after the termination was effectuated, then there can be
no ADA liability.63 In other words, a termination for misconduct
cannot become unlawful solely because the employee happens to have
a medical condition. Also, if the invocation of the disability seems to
be merely an ex post excuse for misconduct in which the plaintiff chose
to engage, then the claim is practically certain to fail.64 Before even
entertaining whether discrimination has occurred, courts will require
the plaintiff to show some “causal nexus” between her alleged
disability and the conduct that formed the basis for her termination.65
Finally, there is a clean hands requirement with regard to the
disability’s causing of the misconduct; if, for example, a plaintiff was
negligent in taking his medication and as a result engages in
misconduct, there can be no ADA liability for the employer who
terminates him for the misconduct.66 This all assumes, of course, that
the plaintiff fits within the ADA’s protected class of “qualified
individuals.” If the plaintiff cannot show that he could perform the
essential functions of the position, or if he cannot establish that he has
a disability in the legal sense, then whether discrimination occurred is
of no moment to the courts.
Therefore, in analyzing the circuit split regarding disabilitycaused misconduct, and in suggesting reform in this area of the law,
when this Note refers to cases which the majority rule and minority

62 E.g., Humphrey, 239 F.3d at 1130–33.
63 See, e.g., Alamillo v. BNSF Ry. Co., 869 F.3d 916, 920 (9th Cir. 2017) (plaintiff could
not establish causation in case involving a termination for misconduct because employer
did not know about disability when it decided to initiate disciplinary proceedings).
64 See, e.g., Dewitt v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 845 F.3d 1299, 1316 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting
Davila v. Qwest Corp., Inc., 113 Fed. App’x 849, 854 (10th Cir. 2004)) (concluding that an
employer never has to provide a fresh start/second chance to an employee “whose disability
could be offered as an after-the-fact excuse”).
65 See, e.g., Trujillo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 330 Fed. App’x 137, 139 (9th Cir. 2009)
(affirming summary judgment for employer, despite Ninth Circuit rule that conduct
resulting from a disability is considered to be part of the disability, because employee failed
to show that his absences were related to his disabilities).
66 See Den Hartog v. Wasatch Acad., 129 F.3d 1076, 1087 (10th Cir. 1997)
(distinguishing Siefken v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 65 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 1995) on grounds
that the misconduct in Siefken was a result of plaintiff’s own failure to monitor his
condition).
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rule courts would decide differently, it speaks of a case in which the
following factual assertions are true. First, either the employer knows
of, or a reasonable employer would know of, the existence and nature
of the employee’s disability. Second, the stated purpose for the
termination was that the employee engaged in misconduct. Third, the
disability was a but-for cause of the misconduct. Finally, the employee
could not have prevented the disability from causing the misconduct
by exercising ordinary care. In sum, this Note deals with the disability
discrimination case where (a) an employee has an impairment that,
under the ADA, qualifies as a disability (b) and that renders her unable
to comply with a workplace conduct rule, (c) the violation of which
forms the basis for her termination (d) by someone who had actual or
constructive knowledge of the disability before the termination was
effectuated.
Two questions arise under this fact pattern. First, can such an
employer be held liable for disability discrimination? Second, if the
ADA does impose liability for the termination, under which theory of
discrimination—disparate treatment, disparate impact, or failure to
accommodate—should courts scrutinize the claim and allocate the
evidentiary burdens among the parties? The remainder of this Note
addresses how the federal courts of appeals have responded to these
questions and evaluates how their responses conform to the text and
fulfill the purposes of the ADA.
A. The Majority View: The ADA Permits Terminations Based on DisabilityCaused Misconduct
The majority view is demonstrated clearly in Palmer v. Circuit Court
of Cook County.67 Plaintiff’s employer, the county court, subjected her
to progressive discipline that culminated in her termination.68
Management predicated the discipline and termination on a series of
co-worker disputes, including incidents where plaintiff called her coworker and supervisor a “bitch,” threatened to throw one coworker
out a window, and said that she “could just kill” her supervisor, whom
she said “would be better off dead.”69 During this period, plaintiff
requested leave to attend an out-patient program for mental illness;70
she was prescribed medication for what her doctor called “paranoid

67 117 F.3d 351 (7th Cir. 1997) (affirming grant of employer’s motion for summary
judgment).
68 Id. at 351–52.
69 Palmer v. Cir. Ct. of Cook Cnty., 905 F. Supp. 499, 501–02 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (granting
employer’s motion for summary judgment).
70 Id. at 502.
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delusions”;71 and, following the threats against her supervisor, she was
involuntarily committed to a hospital where she was diagnosed with
“[d]elusional (paranoid) disorder” and “[m]ajor [d]epression.”72
Immediately after her release from the hospital, the county court
terminated the plaintiff, citing her “pattern of abusive behavior.”73
Plaintiff sued in federal court for disability discrimination under
the ADA. In granting the employer’s motion for summary judgment,
the district court noted, “[t]here is no dispute that plaintiff was fired
due to her inability to control the expression of her mental illness in
the workplace,”74 but concluded that the evidence indicated “that
plaintiff’s termination was based on her past misconduct . . . [not] due
to her alleged disability.”75
Judge Richard Posner, writing for a majority in the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, affirmed the grant of summary judgment. 76 At first,
the appellate court corrected the court below, observing that “it is not
possible to negate the inference that [plaintiff] has in fact a disabling
mental illness.”77 Judge Posner opined that the “paranoid delusions”
plaintiff experienced “are typical symptoms of schizophrenia.”78
However, the court continued:
[T]he judgment of the district court must still be affirmed. There
is no evidence that Palmer was fired because of her mental illness.
She was fired because she threatened to kill another employee.
The cause of the threat was, we may assume, her mental illness . . . .
But if an employer fires an employee because of the employee’s
unacceptable behavior, the fact that that behavior was precipitated
by a mental illness does not present an issue under the Americans
with Disabilities Act.79

Hence, both the District Court and the Seventh Circuit in this case
drew a sharp distinction between being terminated “because of [a]
mental illness” and being terminated because of misconduct “the
cause of [which] was . . . mental illness.” 80 This distinction is typical of
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 509.
75 Id. at 511.
76 Palmer v. Cir. Ct. of Cook Cnty., 117 F.3d 351, 353 (7th Cir. 1997).
77 Id. at 352.
78 Id.
79 Id. Here, Judge Posner quoted a scene from Hamlet in which the young Hamlet
seeks pardon for a wrong that should, he says, be excused by his (feigned) madness: “[w]as’t
Hamlet wrong’d Laertes? Never Hamlet./ If Hamlet from himself be ta’en away,/ And
when he’s not himself does wrong Laertes,/ Then Hamlet does it not; Hamlet denies it./
Who does it then? His madness.” Id. (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 5, sc. 2,
ll. 247–51).
80 See Palmer, 117 F.3d at 352.
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the courts that follow the majority rule, which distinguish disabilities
from misconduct they might induce.81
B. The Tenth Circuit Approach (Disparate Impact)
Four months after the Seventh Circuit held that a termination
based on disability-caused misconduct warranted no relief under the
ADA, the Tenth Circuit decided the opposite. In Den Hartog v. Wasatch
Academy, the Tenth Circuit held that a “sharp dichotomy” between
disability and disability-caused conduct “would make no sense” under
the ADA.82 Den Hartog thus became the first decision in which a federal
court of appeals applied the minority rule to an ADA case.
Den Hartog worked for Wasatch as a teacher, a school historian,
and a groundskeeper from 1964 through most of 1994.83 Den Hartog’s
son Nathaniel, who lived with his father on the Wasatch campus, was,
in 1992, diagnosed with bipolar affective disorder.84 Nathaniel had
developed a close relationship with Travis Loftin, the son of Wasatch’s
headmaster, Joseph Loftin, and after his diagnosis began threatening
the Loftin family over the phone, such as by telling them to “keep a
very close eye” on their four-year-old daughter.85 Shortly thereafter,
Nathaniel was involuntarily committed to a mental hospital. 86
However, he was released after less than a month of treatment and
subsequently continued his threatening behaviors.87 After an incident
in which Nathaniel battered a former schoolmate and warned
thereafter that Joseph Loftin was “next,” Nathaniel was arrested and
sent to Utah State Hospital for a competency evaluation.88 Following
the arrest, Joseph informed Den Hartog that Wasatch would not be
renewing his contract the following year.89
Den Hartog sued for disability discrimination, claiming that
Wasatch discriminated against him on the basis of his son’s disability.
81 E.g., Jones v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 192 F.3d 417, 429 (4th Cir. 1999) (“The
law is well settled that the ADA is not violated when an employer discharges an individual
based upon the employee’s misconduct, even if the misconduct is related to a disability.”);
Maddox v. Univ. of Tenn., 62 F.3d 843, 846–47 (6th Cir. 1995) (district court did not err in
distinguishing between discharge for misconduct and discharge by reason of disability);
Hamilton v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir. 1998) (“The cause of
[plaintiff’s] discharge was not discrimination based on PTSD but was rather his failure to
recognize the acceptable limits of behavior in a workplace environment.”).
82 Den Hartog v. Wasatch Acad., 129 F.3d 1076, 1087 (10th Cir. 1997).
83 Id. at 1078.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 1078–79.
86 Id. at 1079.
87 Id. at 1079–80.
88 Id. at 1080.
89 Id.
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The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Wasatch and
agreed that the ADA was “inapplicable” because Wasatch terminated
Den Hartog “only in response to Nathaniel’s misconduct,” rather than
in response to his disability.90 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed,
stating that “[a]s a general rule, an employer may not hold a disabled
employee to precisely the same standards of conduct as a nondisabled
employee unless such standards are job-related and consistent with
business necessity.”91 This language demonstrates that the Tenth
Circuit viewed Den Hartog’s claim as one of disparate impact; the
discrimination arose not from discriminatory animus but from the way
in which a neutral workplace rule was applied.92 The Tenth Circuit
thus held that an employer must tolerate “eccentric or unusual
conduct caused by the employee’s mental disability” unless either (a)
the employee is not a “qualified individual” or (b) an affirmative
defense applies.93
Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court decision
because the appellate court found that Wasatch had established a
“direct threat” defense. 94 But here the exception proved the rule. The
Tenth Circuit engaged in the direct threat analysis only because, all
else equal, Den Hartog had set forth a cognizable claim of disability
discrimination.95 Absent the success of Wasatch’s affirmative defense,
it would have been a violation of the ADA to terminate Den Hartog by
applying the workplace conduct rule to misconduct which Wasatch
knew was the product of a disability.
C. The Ninth and Second Circuit Approach (Disparate Treatment)
Less than four years after the Tenth Circuit decided Den Hartog,
the Ninth Circuit produced a similar result in Humphrey v. Memorial
Hospitals Association, holding that “[f]or purposes of the ADA, with a
few exceptions, conduct resulting from a disability is considered to be
part of the disability, rather than a separate basis for termination.”96
90 Den Hartog v. Wasatch Acad., 909 F. Supp. 1393, 1400 (D. Utah 1995); id. at 1402
(concluding that “the ADA generally protects disability and not disability-caused
misconduct”).
91 Den Hartog, 129 F.3d at 1086.
92 STEFAN, supra note 2, at 155 (describing the Den Hartog construction as “extremely
important because it precludes employers from devising rules of workplace behavior that,
although neutral on their face, have an enormously disparate impact on employees with
psychiatric disabilities”).
93 Den Hartog, 129 F.3d at 1086, 1088.
94 Id. at 1090.
95 See id. at 1086 (“[T]he district court erred by importing the ‘disability v. disabilitycaused misconduct’ dichotomy into [this] case . . . .”).
96 239 F.3d 1128, 1139–40 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Den Hartog v. Wasatch Acad., 129
F.3d 1076, 1086 (10th Cir. 1997)).
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Humphrey involved a medical transcriptionist who had been diagnosed
with obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD).97 The OCD caused
Humphrey to engage in a series of obsessive rituals each morning, with
the result that she was often unable to get to work on time, if at all.98
After learning that Humphrey’s OCD was contributing to her
attendance problem, the employer granted her a flexible start time.
However, that accommodation proved insufficient, and after
Humphrey was absent two more times, she was terminated. The stated
reason for the termination was her history of tardiness and
absenteeism.99
Humphrey sued her employer for disability discrimination under
a disparate treatment theory. In reversing the decision of the district
court, which had granted summary judgment in favor of the employer,
the Ninth Circuit held that “a jury could reasonably find the requisite
causal link between a disability of OCD and Humphrey’s absenteeism
and conclude that [her employer] fired Humphrey because of her
disability.”100 Thus, the analysis centered not on whether the employer
“h[e]ld the disabled person to exactly the same conduct [standard] as
a nondisabled person,”101 but on whether Humphrey’s employer
terminated her “because of” her disability.102 Therefore, although
both the Den Hartog and Humphrey approaches reached the same
result, the Ninth Circuit departed from Den Hartog in that it treated
the claim as one of disparate treatment, rather than one of disparate
impact.
The Ninth Circuit continued its use of the disparate treatment
approach in Dark v. Curry County.103 Dark, an operator of construction
vehicles, had been diagnosed with epilepsy.104 He controlled his
condition with medication but still experienced occasional seizures,
which were usually preceded by what Dark called an “aura,” indicating
the potential for a seizure on the day of the aura.105 One morning, he
reported to work despite experiencing an aura and suffered a seizure
while driving a pickup truck.106 His passenger, a co-worker, gained
control of the vehicle and brought it to a safe halt. In response to the
incident, the employer terminated Dark, stating that the incident
demonstrated Dark’s disregard for the safety of others and his inability
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106

Id. at 1130.
Id.
Id. at 1133.
Id. at 1140.
Den Hartog, 129 F.3d at 1086.
Humphrey, 239 F.3d at 1133.
451 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1081.
Id.
Id.
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to perform the essential functions of his job, despite his seventeen
years of experience.107
Dark sued under the ADA. The district court granted summary
judgment for the employer, finding under the McDonnell Douglas
framework that the employer had articulated a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the termination, namely that Dark
reported to work and operated heavy equipment despite being warned
that he might experience an epileptic seizure.108 On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit reversed, holding that the employer had failed to articulate a
nondiscriminatory reason:
[T]he reason given for Dark’s termination must actually constitute
a valid nondiscriminatory explanation, i.e., one that “disclaims any
reliance on the employee’s disability in having taken the
employment action.” . . . The County does not argue that Dark’s
“misconduct” resulted from other than [sic] his disability. Thus,
the Board’s explanation, as a matter of law, fails to qualify as a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for Dark’s discharge.109

Since it was undisputed that the misconduct was caused by the
disability, the articulation of the misconduct as the reason for
termination failed to “disclaim any reliance” on Dark’s disability. It is
clear from this reasoning that the Ninth Circuit views disability-caused
misconduct as a sort of proxy for the disability itself. Thus, in claiming
to rely on the misconduct in making the employment decision, the
employer essentially concedes having discriminated against the
employee on the basis of disability. This approach is directly opposite
the majority view, which considers misconduct a legitimate reason for
termination and burdens the plaintiff with proving that the articulated
reason was pretextual.110
D. The Supreme Court Speaks: Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez
The closest the Supreme Court came to resolving this circuit split
was in deciding Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez.111 The plaintiff in Raytheon
was fired in 1991 for testing positive for cocaine after appearing to be
under the influence of drugs at work.112 Years later, in 1994, the
plaintiff applied to be rehired by the same employer, including in his
application proof that he had been attending Alcoholics Anonymous
107 Id.
108 Dark v. Curry Cnty., No. Civ. 03-3041-CO, 2004 WL 2009407, at *5–6 (D. Or. Sept.
8, 2004).
109 Dark, 451 F.3d at 1084 (quoting Snead v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 237 F.3d
1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 2001)).
110 See supra text accompanying notes 67–81.
111 540 U.S. 44 (2003).
112 Id. at 47.
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meetings and was in recovery.113 The reviewer of his application
rejected it, however, citing a company policy against rehiring
employees who were terminated for workplace misconduct.114 Since
the 1991 separation letter recorded plaintiff’s discharge as simply a
“discharge for personal conduct,” the reviewer, who never met
plaintiff during his earlier period of employment, could not have
known about plaintiff’s history of substance abuse nor about the details
of his termination.115 Nevertheless, the plaintiff sued under a disparate
treatment theory and failed to plead or raise the disparate impact theory
in a timely manner.116
Ultimately, this procedural hiccup—probably a result of the
plaintiff’s confusion about the difference between disparate treatment
and disparate impact—cost the plaintiff his case. The trial court
granted the employer’s motion for summary judgment on grounds
that the employer had articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the rejection of plaintiff’s application, namely, the company
policy against rehiring those fired previously for misconduct.117
However, the Ninth Circuit reversed. It held that the no-rehire policy
was not a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason because the policy, as
applied, “serve[d] to bar the reemployment of a drug addict despite
his successful rehabilitation.”118 The Supreme Court then granted
certiorari to determine “whether the ADA confers preferential rehire
rights on disabled employees lawfully terminated for violating
workplace conduct rules.”119 In other words, the issue was whether an
ex-employee terminated for misconduct might receive special
treatment (“preferential rehire rights”) where the misconduct was the
result of a disability. Resolution of this question probably would have
settled the circuit split, at least implicitly, because a holding that the
ADA did confer preferential rehire rights would have implied that
employers must react differently to misconduct in cases where the
misconduct was disability related.120
The Court, however, did not reach the question on which it
granted certiorari.121 It simply held that the Ninth Circuit erred in
applying a disparate impact theory in what was, by virtue of the
plaintiff’s failure to plead disparate impact, indisputably a disparate
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 49.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 51 (quoting Hernandez v. Hughes Missile Sys. Co., 298 F.3d 1030, 1036–37
(9th Cir. 2002)).
119 Raytheon, 540 U.S. at 46.
120 See Timmons, supra note 21, at 231.
121 Raytheon, 540 U.S. at 46.
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treatment case. The Court held that, in rejecting the proffered
nondiscriminatory reason because the no-rehire policy would
“screen[] out”122 rehabilitated addicts, the Ninth Circuit conflated the
analytical frameworks for disparate impact and disparate treatment
claims. A disparate treatment analysis, the Court reasoned, would have
compelled the conclusion that the proffered reason was legitimate and
nondiscriminatory because it was a rationale that disclaimed any
reliance on plaintiff’s membership in a protected class in making the
employment decision. Again, the reviewer of plaintiff’s application
could not have been motivated to reject the application because of
plaintiff’s disability, as she was entirely unaware that such a disability
existed.123 So the Court simply remanded the case to have the correct
framework applied. Yet, in a footnote that is arguably dicta, the Court
added:
To the extent that the [lower] court suggested that, because
respondent’s workplace misconduct is related to his disability,
petitioner’s refusal to rehire respondent on account of that
workplace misconduct violated the ADA, we point out that we have
rejected a similar argument in the context of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act.124

This footnote led some scholars to conclude that Raytheon “implicitly
rejected” the disparate treatment approach to disability-caused
misconduct cases.125 This characterization probably overstates the
meaning of the footnote in question, given that the responsible
management official in Raytheon lacked any knowledge or reason to
know of plaintiff’s disability and that the court expressly stated that it
did not reach the question of whether misconduct warrants different
treatment when it is disability-related.126 Furthermore, courts in the
Ninth Circuit have continued to apply the disparate treatment version
of the minority rule in post-Raytheon cases, without a word from the
Supreme Court.127 In any event, the procedural nature of the holding
in Raytheon, coupled with the lack of any other Supreme Court cases
addressing the disability-caused misconduct issue, has left the circuit
split unresolved.

122 Id. at 51 (quoting Hernandez, 298 F.3d at 1036–37).
123 See id. at 54 n.7.
124 Id. at 54 n.6 (citing Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 611 (1993)).
125 Timmons, supra note 21, at 236.
126 Raytheon, 540 U.S. at 46–47.
127 See, e.g., Dark v. Curry Cnty., 451 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2006); EEOC v. Walgreen Co.,
34 F. Supp. 3d 1049 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
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THE MINORITY VIEW BETTER SERVES THE TEXT AND PURPOSES OF
THE ADA

A. The Majority View is a Misguided Interpretation, and Counteracts the
Purposes, of the ADA
The first statutory interpretation problem the majority view
encounters has to do with 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(4) (2018), which
provides that an employee who engages in the illegal use of drugs or
who is an alcoholic may be held to the same qualification standards for
job behavior as other employees, “even if any unsatisfactory
performance or behavior is related to the drug use or alcoholism of
such employee.”
Under the majority view, this provision is
superfluous. If Judge Posner was correct to say that a discharge for
misconduct caused by any disability “does not present an issue
under”128 the ADA, then why would the statute need to specify that a
discharge for misconduct caused by a certain kind of disability is legally
permissible? The sensible reading of this provision is that the ADA
contemplates a distinction between disabilities and conduct caused by
disabilities only in the context of alcoholism and drugs. The inclusion
of one thing is the exclusion of others; if it is necessary to say that an
employer may discipline an employee for disability-caused misconduct
when the disability in question is alcoholism or drug addiction, it
follows that, where neither alcoholism nor drugs are involved, the
employer may not discipline an employee for disability-caused
misconduct, absent other defenses.
The § 12114(c)(4) dilemma might be excused as a legislative
oversight were it not for the presence of a similar problem in the
“defenses” section of Title 42. Section 12113 provides certain
affirmative defenses to discrimination claims, including the “direct
threat” defense, which states that an employer may take action against
an employee who poses a “direct threat to the health or safety of other
individuals in the workplace.”129 Assume for a moment that the
majority view is correct: adverse employment action predicated on
workplace misconduct does not constitute discrimination in the first
place. Why, then, would an affirmative defense be necessary to protect
employers who discipline or disqualify an individual for endangering
the safety of others? The majority view would limit the direct threat
defense to cases where an employee with a disability has not engaged
in any misconduct but somehow still poses a significant risk to the
128 Palmer v. Cir. Ct. of Cook Cnty., 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir. 1997).
129 See 42 U.S.C. § 12113 (a)–(b) (2018). “Direct threat” is defined as “a significant
risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable
accommodation.” Id. § 12111(3).
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health and safety of others. One might conceive of circumstances
where both those conditions are present but it would be strange to
limit one of the main defenses to ADA employment discrimination
liability to such a narrow category of cases. Furthermore, the
definition of “direct threat” suggests that if the risk to health or safety
can be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, then the defense
does not apply. This caveat implies that sometimes disability-caused
misconduct must be accommodated; but this proposition is
irreconcilable with the idea that the ADA does not prevent employers
from firing employees whose disabilities cause them to engage in
misconduct.130
These statutory anomalies should be interpreted with an eye
toward establishing coverage for individuals with disabilities as broadly
as the text of the statute will permit. Federal courts, including the
Supreme Court, have exhibited a tendency to interpret anti-disability
discrimination provisions all too narrowly.131 It was in response to that
phenomenon that Congress enacted the ADAAA and amended the
chapter-wide definition of “disability” to include “[r]ules of
construction regarding the definition of disability.” 132 As such, the
statute itself now provides that the definition of disability “shall be
construed in favor of broad coverage . . . to the maximum extent”
permitted by the terms of text and that the phrase “‘substantially limits’
shall be interpreted consistently with the findings and purposes of the
[ADAAA].”133 The ADA was enacted in light of congressional findings
that individuals with disabilities encounter various forms of
discrimination, including “overprotective rules and policies” and
“exclusionary qualification standards and criteria.”134 A per se
exclusion of disability-caused misconduct from the forbidden bases of
employment action goes directly against these stated purposes. As
suggested by the name of the agency charged with implementing
workplace antidiscrimination laws, the ideal toward which the ADA
strives is not simply equal treatment, but equal opportunity.135 An
employee discharged because her disability caused her to violate a
workplace conduct standard may have been treated in a manner
“equal” with respect to other, nondisabled employees who broke the
same rule, but the refusal to distinguish between those employees and

130 This was the reasoning of the court in Den Hartog v. Wasatch Acad., 129 F.3d 1076,
1087 (10th Cir. 1997).
131 See Timmons, supra note 21, at 282.
132 See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4) (2018).
133 Id. § 12102(4)(a)–(b).
134 Id. § 12101(a)(5).
135 See Timmons, supra note 21, at 238 (noting that the “objective” of the ADA is equal
opportunity, as opposed to equal treatment).
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the employee whose conduct violations are unlawful is essentially a
refusal to recognize equal opportunity.
Furthermore, a statute should not be construed in a manner that
encourages the very type of behavior it seeks to deter or that otherwise
produces absurd results. The majority view regarding disability-caused
misconduct violates that principle because it incentivizes employers in
certain circumstances to terminate employees with disabilities that
otherwise may have been retained in the absence of potential ADA
liability. At first blush, the majority rule is, from the employer’s
perspective, attractively simple: retain employees who can perform
their job and follow the rules, regardless of whether they are disabled
or not; and fire employees who cannot do so, without risk of litigation
even should you happen to know that the misconduct might be related
to a disability. With so many employers across the nation who are
subject to these rules, the value of that simplicity can hardly be
overstated. However, in light of the ADA’s imposition of duties not
just to refrain from discriminatory animus, but to take affirmative steps
to provide reasonable accommodations for employees with disabilities,
the law should not allow employers to escape liability simply by
adopting a “disability-blind” approach. Where an employer discovers
terminable misconduct has been committed by an employee with an
unaccommodated disability, the majority rule may encourage
discrimination against that employee. Imagine, for instance, an
employee with a mental condition that often makes it extremely
difficult to get out of bed in the early morning. She works an early
shift, from 6:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m., and she often shows up late to work,
sometimes by more than an hour, because of her condition. The
employer is considering firing her for her absenteeism, so he confronts
the employee, and discovers that the absenteeism is a result of a
disability. Since in this workplace, as in many others, whether
absenteeism warrants termination is left to the employer’s discretion,
the employer now has a choice to make. He can retain the employee,
perhaps out of sympathy for her (heretofore undisclosed) disability;
but if he does, he will subsequently be obligated to explore reasonable
accommodation options, since now the disability is “known.” This will
require initiating an interactive process to try and meet the employee’s
needs, and it may require revising the schedule to give the employee a
later shift, incurring modest increases in labor costs, or shifting
operating hours to periods that are less profitable.136 Or, the employer
136 See Dunlap v. Liberty Nat. Prods., Inc., 878 F.3d 794, 799 (9th Cir. 2017) (explaining
that an employer has a duty to engage in an interactive process with a disabled individual
to identify reasonable accommodations); Snapp v. United Transp. Union, 889 F.3d 1088,
1095 (9th Cir. 2018) (noting that failure to engage in interactive process constitutes
unlawful discrimination if a reasonable accommodation would have been possible).
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can simply fire the employee and replace her with someone who can
show up on time consistently, potentially increasing the productivity of
the enterprise by having workers present at the time of his choosing,
and probably lowering labor costs since the replacement employee
probably will have a lower pay grade.
Under the majority rule, the termination of the employee is
permissible. There will be no disparate treatment liability because the
absenteeism constitutes a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
adverse employment action. Nor can there be any disparate impact
liability, since the requirement that employees show up to work when
they are scheduled is job-related and consistent with business
necessity.137 As for failure to accommodate liability, it is well-settled
that reasonable accommodations are always prospective, never
retroactive, and so no accommodation is required unless the
misconduct that occurred prior to the discovery of the disability is itself
an insufficient basis for termination.138 Therefore, the ADA will
impose accommodation costs on the employer if he decides to retain
the employee with a disability, but it will decline to impose liability if
the employer fires the employee precisely to avoid those costs. Irony
aside, this hypothetical demonstrates the very real possibility that the
ADA will encourage the termination of employees with disabilities in
certain circumstances, at least under the majority rule regarding
disability-caused misconduct.
Whether one considers the disability-caused misconduct issue in
light of its statutory context, the stated purposes of the ADA and its
amendments, how the equitable principles underlying disability
discrimination law, or all three together, the rationale for the majority
view remains obscure. At the very least, the minority view deserves
reconsideration.
B. Courts Should Adopt the Minority View Under a Failure to Accommodate
Theory
The main reason the minority approach has remained the
minority approach is probably the erroneous belief that to abandon
the disability versus disability-caused-misconduct distinction would
leave workplaces vulnerable to dangerous employees whom employers

137 Forslund v. Nat’l Tech. & Eng’g Sols. of Sandia, L.L.C., 516 F. Supp. 3d 1285, 1289
(D.N.M. 2021) (“Clearly, attendance is also job-related and consistent with business
necessity.”).
138 McElwee v. Cnty. of Orange, 700 F.3d 635, 641 (2d Cir. 2012) (“A requested
accommodation that simply excuses past misconduct is unreasonable as a matter of law.”);
DeWitt v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 845 F.3d 1299, 1316 (10th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he requirement to
provide reasonable accommodations under the ADAAA is ‘always prospective’ . . . .”).
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would nevertheless hesitate to terminate for fear of incurring ADA
liability.139 This belief, coupled with pervasive stereotypes in our
culture regarding individuals with mental conditions,140 has led many
to be skeptical of any sort of expansion of the minority approach.141
However, stereotypes, no matter how pervasive, should not be allowed
to defeat the efforts of antidiscrimination statutes to provide equal
employment opportunities.
It is very unlikely that adopting a general rule which includes
disability-caused misconduct within the gambit of “on the basis of
disability” would chill employer decisionmaking in situations involving
potentially dangerous individuals. As discussed above, one reason that
the minority approach makes sense as a matter of statutory
interpretation is precisely because the direct threat defense remains
available even once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of
discrimination.142 In abandoning the fiction that conduct caused by a
disability is distinguishable from the disability itself,143 doctrinal
coherence is restored to those provisions of the ADA that specify
circumstances where the conduct should be severed from the
condition, in essence, when the underlying disability involves drug use
or alcoholism, or where the conduct the disability is liable to cause
poses a significant risk of harm to other people. Outside those
circumstances, it is difficult to imagine what purpose could possibly be
served by allowing employers carte blanche to terminate an employee
whenever their disability manifests itself in “misconduct,” like when
139 E.g., James J. McDonald, Jr., Feature: “My Disability Made Me Do It!”: Is Employee
Misconduct Protected if It’s Related to a Disability?, 50 ORANGE CNTY. LAW. 46, 49–50 (2008)
(“Perhaps the [disabled] employee must be given a lecture concerning the dangers
inherent in bringing a loaded weapon to work. Or warned that if he shoots someone he
will be subject to disciplinary action. Or perhaps he should be allowed to keep his gun but
not his bullets.”). Titles like that of McDonald, Jr.’s article, though perhaps facetious, are
not uncommon. See, e.g., Virginia Mixon Swindell, Symposium: Employment Law: But My
Disability Made Me Do It: ADA Claims Involving Disability-Related Misconduct, 69 ADVOCATE 8
(2014); Robert L. Levin, Workplace Violence: Navigating Through the Minefield of Legal Liability,
11 LAB. LAW. 171, 179 (1995) (discussing the caution that employers must exercise before
acting against an employee who claims, “my disability made me do it”).
140 Hsieh, supra note 1, at 993.
141 See, e.g., McDonald, Jr. supra note 139; Swindell, supra note 9.
142 See supra notes 128–30 and accompanying text.
143 The hair-splitting nature of this distinction was illustrated by the Second Circuit in
Teahan v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 951 F.2d 511, 515 (2d Cir. 1991). In a
hypothetical, the court imagined an employee with a permanent limp whose limp caused
the worker to make a loud “thump” whenever he took a step. Id. at 516. Were an employer
to fire the employee because the thumping often disrupted the workplace, the court
reasoned, the employer should not be allowed to escape disability discrimination liability
by relying on conduct “symptomatic” of a handicap rather than on the “handicap itself,”
because judicial recognition of such a distinction would allow any employer to “avoid the
burden of proving that the handicap is relevant to the job qualifications.” Id. at 516–17.
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their OCD makes them late for work,144 or when they take a bag of
chips off the inventory shelf and eat them to prevent their blood sugar
from dropping to dangerous levels.145
However, widespread recognition of the minority rule would
necessitate some tweaks to the doctrine as it exists in cases like
Humphrey or Dark, because it is the failure to accommodate theory,
rather than the disparate treatment or disparate impact theories, that
best captures the type of discrimination that occurs when an employer
fires an employee for misconduct that the employer knew was really a
manifestation of the employee’s disability.
The main reason the disparate treatment theory is a poor fit is that
disparate treatment pertains to traditional, “bad motive”
discrimination whereas in disability-caused misconduct cases the
employer is not necessarily motivated by discriminatory animus. An
employer who, like in our hypothetical above, terminates an employee
solely to avoid the costs and effort that the implementation of a
reasonable accommodation might require does not by his conduct
exhibit an animosity toward people with disabilities. Rather, he
exhibits merely an unwillingness to offer special assistance to an
employee who could be replaced by someone who does require not
assistance. Such employers hinder the accomplishment of the ADA’s
aims not because they act in a way that puts down people with
disabilities but because they refuse to exercise a reasonable effort to
lift them up. Another problem with applying disparate treatment in
these cases is that doing so would likely confuse litigants who often
already find themselves muddling the tripartite McDonnell Douglas
framework. The idea of showing evidence of “pretext” is inapplicable
in disability-caused misconduct cases, because in most of them, the
proffered reason will be the real reason; rarely do employers try to
“cover-up” the fact that they are discharging an employee for violating
a workplace conduct standard. Nor is it helpful to say that misconduct
never constitutes a legitimate, nondiscriminatory motive, because it
may very well be legitimate and nondiscriminatory if the employer
never knew the employee had a disability.146 Finally, implementing the
minority approach under a disparate treatment theory would also
require sidestepping the dicta in Raytheon, which some scholars have
regarded as an implicit disapproval of the use of disparate treatment
in cases of misconduct-predicated terminations.147 The Raytheon dicta
hinted toward the rejection of disparate treatment as applied to
misconduct cases on the ground that the Court had already rejected a
144
145
146
147

See supra notes 96–101 and accompanying text.
EEOC v. Walgreen Co., 34 F. Supp. 3d 1049, 1050 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 54 n.7 (2003).
See, e.g., Timmons, supra note 21, at 236.
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similar argument in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
context,148 meaning perhaps that the failure to accommodate theory,
which is unique to the ADA, would be the Court’s preferred flavor of
the minority view in the event it overturned the majority view.149
As for disparate impact, it might suffice to say that no one wants
to see disparate impact become more complicated than it already is.150
That aside, one doctrinal problem with applying disparate impact in
disability-caused misconduct cases is that disparate impact has no real
mens rea element.151 If disparate treatment is too narrow for this type
of case because it typically requires an “ableist” motive, then disparate
impact is too broad because it typically considers the mental state of
the employer irrelevant. The whole point of disparate impact, after
all, is to capture discrimination that may be unintentional.152 Properly
calibrating liability for terminations predicated on disability-caused
misconduct requires a mental state standard between disparate
treatment and disparate impact, including those cases where the
employer acts less culpably than he would with full-stop discriminatory
animus, but excluding those cases where the employer did not know
enough about the employee’s situation to even realize that an
accommodation may have been necessary. One helpful way of
thinking about the different mental state requirements is in
comparison to the Model Penal Code:153 Disparate treatment requires
an employer to purposefully act against an employee on the basis of
disability; disparate impact requires an employer negligently to exclude
disabled individuals from the workforce;154 and failure to
accommodate requires an employer to be knowingly apathetic toward
the remediable disadvantages an employee experiences by virtue of
her disability.

148 Raytheon, 540 U.S. at 54 n.6.
149 See Hsieh, supra note 1, at 998 (characterizing failure to accommodate as an
additional theory of liability in comparison to other antidiscrimination statutes); Timmons,
supra note 21, at 236–38 (explaining that expanding disparate treatment beyond the
implications of the Raytheon dicta “is not necessary . . . [for] eliminating discrimination
against the disabled caused by thoughtlessness and indifference” because the ADA also
prohibits disparate impact and requires reasonable accommodations).
150 See, e.g., Seiner, supra note 47, at 96 (“Confusion. There is no better way to describe
the current state of U.S. law regarding allegedly discriminatory workplace standards . . . .”);
see also id. at 104 (noting that courts continue to misapply disparate impact and disparate
treatment analyses).
151 See id. at 99 (“The key to any disparate impact claim is that it does not require
intent.”).
152 See supra notes 33–39 and accompanying text.
153 See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (AM. L. INST. 1985).
154 Seiner, supra note 47, at 99 (“[D]isparate impact has been likened to a negligence
theory in claims of discrimination.”).

1760

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 97:4

Thus, the fact that the ADA expressly conditions liability for
failure to accommodate on the impairment being a “known” disability
makes it the best discrimination theory for conceptualizing liability for
disability-caused misconduct terminations.155 To return to the
example above about the employee who is chronically absent from
work—why does such a case befoul the purposes of the ADA? The
answer is that the employer is knowingly circumventing his obligation
to engage in the interactive accommodation process with the
employee. He shirks his duty to accommodate and then retreats
behind the “disability-blind” reason that he simply fired the employee
because she engaged in misconduct—despite the fact that he would be
significantly less incentivized to treat a nondisabled employee the same
way, as outlined above.156 Because the majority rule considers
“misconduct” as per se legitimate reason for adverse employment
action, the employer is allowed to impose termination in lieu of an
accommodation. Essentially, the majority rule creates a troublesome
loophole in the ADA which becomes relevant whenever (1) an
employee’s misconduct is actually caused by her disability but (2) she
fails to disclose the disability and its relation to the misconduct until
the employer considers disciplinary action, and (3) the employer is left
discretion regarding what type of discipline, if any, to impose.157 The
ill-timed disclosure is key. Had the employee disclosed the disability
and its relationship with the misconduct before she had violated
standards to such an extent that would make the employer
contemplate termination, there would be no question that, despite

155 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (b)(5)(A) (2018) (including as construction of
discrimination “not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability”).
156 See supra notes 136–38 and accompanying text.
157 The EEOC guidance seems to assume that the disciplinary process in response to
employee misconduct lends itself to a clear-cut application of prescribed punishments for
different types of violations. See U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC-CVG-20031, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP
UNDER THE ADA ¶ 36 (2002) (“An employer must make reasonable accommodation to
enable an otherwise qualified employee with a disability to meet such a conduct standard
in the future . . . except where the punishment for the violation is termination.”); U.S.
EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC-CVG-1997-2, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON THE
ADA AND PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES ¶ 30 (1997) [hereinafter EEOC GUIDANCE ON THE ADA
AND PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES] (providing an example of how to discipline a disabled
employee’s misconduct assuming that the employer has a “policy of immediately
terminating the employment of anyone who threatens a supervisor”). The reality, however,
seems to be that employers, even when establishing categories of work rule violations, retain
discretion to impose even the most severe penalties, i.e., termination, when circumstances
warrant. E.g., 1 STEPHEN P. PEPE & SCOTT H. DUNHAM, AVOIDING AND DEFENDING
WRONGFUL DISCHARGE CLAIMS § 4:03 (2008) (practical guidance advising employers to
reserve the right to discharge employees for nonserious offenses).
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whatever lesser discipline imposed for the first few offenses, the
employer would have a duty to accommodate the disability going
forward. On the other hand, had the employee failed to disclose the
disability until after she was fired, the knowledge prong of the failure
to accommodate framework could not be satisfied, and thus the
employer could not be held liable for failing to accommodate a
disability of which he was totally unaware.
The legal test for this tweaked version of the minority rule, then,
might look something like the following. First, the plaintiff would
establish a prima facie case by showing that (1) she is an individual with
a disability; (2) she is “otherwise qualified” for the position from which
she was terminated; (3) there exists a “causal nexus” between the
disability and the conduct on which her termination was predicated;
and (4) the management official responsible for her termination, at a
point in time before the termination decision was finalized, knew or
should have known about both the existence of the disability and its
causal connection to the misconduct. If the plaintiff satisfies these
elements under a preponderance of the evidence standard, the
burden will shift to the employer to prove an affirmative defense, such
as by showing (a) that there exists no reasonable accommodation
which would allow the employee to comply with the conduct standard
in the future to the extent required by business necessity; (b) that
retention of the employee would pose a significant risk of substantial
harm to the safety of other individuals in the workplace; or (c) that
engaging in the accommodation process would subject the employer
to undue hardship.
This formulation strives to preserve the traditional threshold
requirements of an ADA case (as (1) and (2) establish the plaintiff’s
membership in the protected class) but also focuses the inquiry on the
underlying cause of the conduct that predicated the termination and
the responsible official’s actual or constructive knowledge of it. It also
declines to graft onto the case the McDonnell Douglas disparate
treatment framework nor the disparate impact analysis. Note that this
test dispenses with both (a) the categorical rejection of the idea that
an employer never has to tolerate an employee’s misconduct and (b)
the maxim that “reasonable accommodation is never ‘retroactive.’”158
Dispensing with the former recognizes that tolerance for misconduct
is unproblematic insofar as the direct threat defense remains
unavailable. Dispensing with the latter recognizes that the idea of
retroactivity with respect to accommodations has been a misnomer;

158 See generally EEOC GUIDANCE ON THE ADA AND PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES, supra
note 157, ¶ 36 (“Since reasonable accommodation is always prospective, an employer is not
required to excuse past misconduct even if it is the result of the individual’s disability.”).
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there is nothing necessarily “retroactive” about refraining from
discipline for conduct for which the employee was not culpable and
which may be remedied going forward by an accommodation.
However, this formulation is probably not the only workable test,
and the central aim of this Note was never to advocate for the
widespread adoption of a particular test one way or the other. Rather,
this Note aims to have illustrated the difference between the majority
rule and the minority rules with respect to terminations for disabilitycaused misconduct and to have demonstrated that the majority rule is
neither a coherent nor a desirable interpretation of the ADA. The
haste with which the federal courts have granted employers a blank
check to remove employees with disabilities wherever the label of
“misconduct” appears justifiably concerns those who wish to see the
promises of the ADA fulfilled. The goal of equal opportunity in the
workforce for individuals with disabilities—even amidst prevalent
stereotypes about the dangers of the mentally ill—should not be so
easily defeated.

